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REMARKS
WHAT WENT WRONG? A TRAGEDY IN
THREE ACTS*
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.**
It is good to be back in Minneapolis, good to be back at St. Thomas,
and great to be back at the Holloran Center.
I am going to tell today a simple story of greed, rationalization, and
sloth; it is a tragedy in three acts. The first act involves the collapse of what
I will call the Great American Housing Bubble. The second act involves the
failure of the gatekeepers, in particular; what happened at those credit rating
agencies that could lead them to rate everything investment-grade? In the
final act, I will turn to the collapse of the investment banks, the failure of
securities regulation, and where that leaves us.
Although this is a tragedy, it is not a Shakespearian tragedy because
Shakespearian tragedies feature either a noble hero or an epic villain; but
there is no such greatness anywhere in this story. Its cast resembles more a
herd of lemmings racing over a cliff, each trying to get out in front of the
others.
Nor is it a Greek tragedy, because there is no inevitability. The gods
did not decree these outcomes. And a few firms were actually smart enough
largely to escape the crisis, thus proving that failure was not inevitable.
If my tune suggests a skepticism of the business community, it may
have some Marxian roots. However, the Marx that is influencing me is not
Karl, but Groucho Marx. Some of the things that happen in this story look
as if they could have been lifted from scenes in A Night at the Opera or A
Day at the Races.
Precisely because the recent financial collapse was so devastating, re-
sembling the perfect storm or the 500-year flood, its story may strike some
as a unique chapter in financial history that will never be repeated. That
view must be firmly rejected. The critical message to this story is that these
failures can and predictably will recur, unless there is regulatory change.
* This transcript has been lightly edited for purposes of this publication.
** Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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ACT ONE
  With that backdrop, let me move on to the enormous housing bubble that
inflated during the post-2000 period. This is very recent history, but for
many on Wall Street, that a bubble arose is an exculpatory conclusion. They
will tell you, “Well, it’s sad, but bubbles happen, and when bubbles happen,
investors lose their senses. There’s mass hysteria and no one’s really to
blame.”
I find this “nobody to blame in a bubble” defense inadequate. Yes,
there are bubbles, but bubbles really come into two categories. There are
demand-driven bubbles, and there are supply-driven bubbles. Demand-
driven bubbles are more common. We last saw one with the Internet bub-
ble, which burst in 2000. True enough, there was a certain irrational eupho-
ria among investors at that time about anything that involved the Internet,
and they overvalued Internet startups, giving them nearly infinite price/
earnings ratios.
But the current crisis is different. It arose in the debt markets, not the
equity markets. Little evidence, if any, suggests that there was irrational
exuberance about collateralized debt obligation on the part of investors.
They just saw a marginally better rate of return, and they relied on the credit
rating agencies with a confidence that proved ill-founded. In a supply-
driven bubble, the “sell” side loses its sense of proportion and begins, for
reasons next discussed, to make money available on a relaxed, and ulti-
mately promiscuous, basis.
Driving this very different bubble was the rise, and eventually the fail-
ure, of a new financial technology, known as Asset-Backed Securitization.
As will be seen, this financial technology depended very heavily on gate-
keepers—that is, on professionals that investors trust to do what investors
cannot do for themselves.1 In the modern world, specialization is inevitable,
self-help remedies have little efficacy, and thus reliance on gatekeepers can-
not be avoided.
Asset-backed securitizations grew at an exponential pace. Fifteen years
ago, they were a trivial percentage of all debt issued in the United States.
However, by around 2002, the volume of debt issued in asset-based securi-
tizations exceeded the total amount of corporate bonds issued by corporate
issuers in the United States.2 From 2002 to 2006, the volume of asset-
backed offerings grew to greatly exceed traditional corporate debt.
1. For a general discussion of the concept of “gatekeepers” as reputational intermediaries
who perform certifying and verification services for investors, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATE-
KEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 4–10 (2006).
2. In 2002, corporate issuers sold $636.7 billion in straight corporate debt and $30.5 billion
in convertible debt, whereas “asset-backed debt” in that year came to $469.2 billion and “Non-
agency MBS” (or mortgage-backed securities) came to $263.9 billion, for a total of $733.1 billion.
In 1994, “asset-backed debt” came to only $81.7 billion. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A.
SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (11th ed. 2009) at 11–12.
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What explains this sudden growth? As a financial technology, asset-
backed securitizations enabled investment banks to package home mort-
gages into a security that could be marketed on a global basis, generating a
new source of revenue for investment banks that were facing increasing
competition from commercial banks. In turn, this technology channeled an
extraordinary amount of capital to the mortgage markets. Between 2001 and
2006, the availability of mortgage funds increased sharply, with most of this
increase being channeled to poorer communities where previously there had
been a high denial rate on mortgage applications.3
However, two years after this increase began in 2002 or 2003, it was
followed by a parallel increase in mortgage defaults.4 These mortgage de-
faults occurred in exactly the same high-latent-demand zip codes. Two Bus-
iness School Professors at the University of Chicago, Atif Mian and Amir
Sufi, have developed an elaborate database showing, on a zip code-by-zip
code basis, where the new mortgage funds went and where defaults oc-
curred over a 20-year period. They find that a one-standard deviation in the
supply of mortgage funds from 2001 to 2005 produced more than a one-half
standard deviation in mortgage default rates thereafter.5
That the rate of default was higher in poor communities is hardly sur-
prising. After all, the poor are higher risk borrowers. But the truly surpris-
ing conclusion was that the rate of mortgage defaults was highest in those
zip codes that had the highest rate of mortgage securitization.6 Even more
revealing, the highest rates of default occurred on those mortgage loans
where the mortgage loan originator sold the mortgage to an unaffiliated
financial firm.7 Another recent academic study has found that a loan portfo-
lio that was securitized was 20 percent more likely to default than an other-
wise similar portfolio of mortgages that was not securitized.8
Now, those are surprising conclusions. What do they mean? They
probably imply that mortgage bankers actually could distinguish, based on
subjective criteria, those among otherwise objectively similar mortgage bor-
rowers who were more likely to default; with this knowledge, they sold the
less creditworthy loans to unrelated parties, while retaining the more
creditworthy loans themselves. Of course, that is what you would do, too, if
you could accurately evaluate which loans were riskier. But that it occurred
systematically means that somewhere there was a systematic failure.
3. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence
from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis 20–21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 13936, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121728.
4. Id. at 24–27.
5. Id. at 27.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from
Subprime Loans 2–3 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137.
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What explains this? A conclusion that recent researchers have drawn—
and that I agree with—is that securitization led to lax screening by the loan
originator.9 Again, that should not be surprising. If you know that you do
not have to bear the economic risk of an investment, and if you can make
very high front-end fees on originating the loan, you will happily make and
transfer mortgages and expend little time on screening borrowers—so long
as you have buyers for the portfolios of mortgages that you are creating.
In economic terms, this is a classic moral hazard problem. Because
you do not bear the risks, you will expend little time or effort on precau-
tions, such as screening borrowers. But gatekeepers—in particular, the
credit rating agencies—should have anticipated this shortfall and adjusted
their own procedures and ratings.
Unsurprising as it was that lenders economized on due diligence when
they did not bear the risk, the rapidity of this deterioration in lending stan-




Share Income Loan/Value ARM Share Share
2001 28.5% 39.7% 84.0% 73.8% 0.0%
2002 38.6% 40.1% 84.4% 80.0% 2.3%
2003 42.8% 40.5% 86.1% 80.1% 8.6%
2004 45.2% 41.2% 84.9% 89.4% 27.3%
2005 50.7% 41.8% 83.2% 93.3% 37.8%
2006 50.8% 42.4% 83.4% 91.3% 22.8%
Virtually leaping off the page here is the sharp increase, from 2001 to
2006, in low no-document loans, which rose from 28.5% of subprime mort-
gages in 2001 to 50.8% in 2006.
A no-document loan is more colloquially known these days as a “liar’s
loan”; sometimes, it is also called a “NINJA loan,” meaning “No Income,
No Job, No Assets.” This sharp rise from 2001 to 2006 measures the grow-
ing indifference of those buying these loan portfolios from the loan origina-
tors to the creditworthiness of their borrowers.
Equally revealing is the column in the foregoing table showing the
increase in adjustable rate mortgages. These are what are also known as
“teaser loans.” They have an initial low interest rate that rises after a few
years. Now, some will see this as predatory lending, and it may be in some
cases. Alternatively, these borrowers may have included risk-taking bor-
9. See id.; Mian and Sufi, supra note 3.
10. Allen Ferrell et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007–2008
Credit Crisis 83 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582.
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rowers who said to themselves: “I can’t pay this loan at 6 percent, but I can
pay the first two years at 2 percent and then hope at the end of two years I
can flip this house and thereby make a 30 percent gain.” That also is a risky
bet that assumes housing prices will always rise (and historically they have
frequently dipped).
In any event, by 2006, we move up to 91 percent of mortgage-backed-
securitization mortgages having a loan rate that changes. That, of course, is
a factor that greatly increases the default rate if you cannot sell or cannot
refinance (which is what happens when housing prices fall).
Between 2001 and 2006, lenders and loan originators also began to
make “interest only” mortgage loans. As the foregoing chart shows, these
amount to zero percent in 2001, but they grew to 23 percent in 2006. These
are loans being made to people who, even on the face of it, do not have the
ability to pay a monthly payment that will amortize the mortgage. Hence,
they are paying only the interest for a period of time without any repayment
of principal. They represent about a quarter of the total share of subprime
mortgages by 2006.
Why did lenders display such indifference to credit quality? The un-
derlying assumption of both the people making these loans and the gate-
keeper evaluating them—the credit rating agency—was that housing prices
would probably continue to rise at a level rate (say, 2 percent a year). In that
kind of world, it mattered little if the borrower defaulted because the prop-
erty would still grow in value. This premise proved wrong, but that is not
the whole story.
Something else was changing at this same time, and it relates to our
concern about ethics. Over this period from roughly 1996 to 2006, there
was a very rapid decline in the due diligence associated with these offer-
ings. When you go back to the early days—the early days being the mid-
1990s—of asset-backed securitization, the investment banking firm that
was going to buy this portfolio of mortgage loans from a savings bank (or a
mortgage loan broker) would typically retain a special due-diligence firm.
The due-diligence firms—Clayton Holdings was the best known of
them11—would send a squad of experienced professionals out to the sav-
ings bank or other loan originator, and they would screen the mortgages in
the portfolio, possibly checking something like 30 percent of them. Based
on this sampling, they would report back to the investment banker as to
whether the loan portfolio fell within the usual lending parameters for the
investment bank.
11. Clayton Holdings has received considerable media attention after entering into an agree-
ment with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to cooperate in return for immunity with
his investigation of whether investment banks hid material information from investors and credit
rating agencies. See Amir Efrati, Due-Diligence Firm to Aid New York Subprime Probe, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 28, 2008, at A2.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-AUG-09 14:56
408 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:2
That was 1996. Thereafter, the sampling gradually goes down from 30
percent, to 20 percent, to 5 percent, eventually to zero percent.12 The Los
Angeles Times has reported that sometimes the due diligence firms told the
investment banks that the loan portfolio was well outside the usual parame-
ters, but the investment banks chose not to listen and closed the deal any-
way.13 By the early-2000s, investment banks largely stopped using the due-
diligence firms. From there on, they were largely flying blind.
That takes us through the first chapter. What have we seen? More is
happening than simply the deterioration in lending standards. The higher
default rate on loans that are securitized shows that the loan originators
were behaving quite rationally. They simply recognized, perhaps gradually
at first, that investment banks were increasingly ready to buy portfolios of
mortgages with little and eventually no due diligence. The result was moral
hazard. If anything can be sold to the investment banks, the loan originators
quickly came to be willing to make loans without regard to credit quality—
because they did not expect to hold these loans long enough to face any
risk.
Thus, the true mystery here is not why loan originators made unsound
loans, but why investment banks bought them. The direction of the causal-
ity, I suggest, is from investment banks to the loan origination field, not the
reverse.
You will hear from my friends at investment banks the opposite story.
“We were inundated with bad loans.” Yes, they were, but it was because
they stopped monitoring loan quality. Once you signal you will buy any-
thing, loan quality naturally deteriorated rapidly.
Now, that raises the next questions: Where were the gatekeepers? Why
was no one looking? Who should have been looking? Here, we move on to
our next chapter about the failure of gatekeepers.
ACT TWO
  Who are gatekeepers? Elsewhere, I have described them in typically
wordy academic terms as “reputational intermediaries.”14 They are the ex-
perts on whom investors rely because investors themselves cannot do the
necessary investigative work (in this case, the work of deciding which
mortgage portfolios are creditworthy and which are not). As reputational
intermediaries, gatekeepers pledge a reputational capital that they have ac-
quired over many years and many clients so that investors will trust their
opinions (on the premise that they would not reasonably forfeit or sacrifice
12. See Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Andersen, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A1.
13. See Scott Reckard, LENDING: Sub-prime mortgage watchdogs kept on leash; Loan
checkers say their warnings were met with indifference, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at C1.
14. See COFFEE, supra note 1, at 4–10.
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that capital for the modest profit that they could make on a single
transaction).
Investors were particularly unable to investigate for themselves in the
case of structured finance because it is inherently opaque. As outsiders,
investors cannot evaluate the quality of the underlying collateral. A CDO is
not like a corporate bond where you can at least look at the SEC filings, the
issuer’s audited financial statements, or just the issuer’s stock price to tell
you how it was doing. Because none of this extrinsic evidence is available
in the case of structured finance, investors had to rely on what the credit
rating agency told them—or not buy.
In overview, investment banks bought unsound loans because they
knew they could securitize them on a global basis if—and only if—they
could obtain investment-grade ratings from major credit rating agencies.
Without that rating, the debt was unmarketable.
Thus, my hypothesis becomes clear: the credit rating agencies were the
critical gatekeepers. Potentially, they could have insisted on their traditional
standards, because as a practical matter there were only three agencies at all
relevant times. But they did not. Instead, they relaxed their standards to
accommodate their investment banking clients.
Why did that happen? Arguably, the credit rating agencies had im-
mense reputational capital and should have protected it. After all, Moody’s
has been in business since 1909 and logically should have been particularly
careful of its reputation. Still, there is an inherent ambiguity in the idea of
reputational capital. What was the specific reputation they wanted to pro-
tect? Was it their reputation with investors for being prudent, careful, cau-
tious, and diligent? Or, was it their reputation with investment banks for
being creative, inventive, and problem-solving? Those are two different
reputations, and the latter may have been ultimately more important to the
credit rating agencies.
More importantly, two specific reasons, both rooted in market condi-
tions, explain why the gatekeepers failed at this particular time. Reason one
is that structured finance overtook traditional corporate bonds by 2002.15 As
it did so, the nature of the rating agencies’ clientele changed, and changed
dramatically.
For years, the major rating agencies—Moody’s and Standard &
Poor—could brag that no single client accounted for as much as one percent
of their revenues. Thus, no client could dominate or credibly threaten them
with a loss of significant business, and that gave them professional
independence.
Because even a major issuer—hypothetically, Exxon—might go to the
debt market only every other year or so, it held no economic leverage over
15. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 2.
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the rating agencies, and largely for this reason, the rating agencies easily
maintained their independence.
But this equilibrium changed the moment that structured finance be-
came the source of a majority of the revenues for ratings agencies. For
Moody’s, structured finance amounted to over 54 percent of its ratings rev-
enue as of 2006.16
Even more importantly, the world of structured finance is controlled
by a concentrated group of investment banking firms who brought deals to
the rating agencies on a monthly basis. These investment banks are repeat
players, who also hire the rating agency as their consultant to teach them
the rating agency’s own methodology and thus help them design a product
that can get an investment-grade rating. Thus, the rating agencies were no
longer simply the outside gatekeeper. Acting both as consultants and gate-
keepers, they faced serious conflicts between these two roles.
Still, the key fact is that structured finance was a very concentrated
market. This means that your clients now have greater leverage, because a
single investment bank could account for 10 percent of your structured fi-
nance revenues. Add to this the sudden rise of Fitch Ratings, and for the
first time, there was a real challenger to the duopoly that Moody’s and Stan-
dard & Poor had enjoyed for a long time.
Table Two illustrates just how concentrated this market became:17
TABLE TWO: MBS UNDERWRITERS IN 2007: A VERY
CONCENTRATED MARKET
Proceed Amount +
Number of Market Overallotment Sold in US
Rank Book Runner Offerings Share ($ mill)
1 Lehman Brothers 120 10.80% $100,109
2 Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. 128 9.90% $91,696
3 Morgan Stanley 92 8.20% $75,627
4 JP Morgan 95 7.90% $73,214
5 Credit Suisse 109 7.50% $69,503
6 Bank of America Securities 101 6.80% $62,776
LLC
7 Deutsche Bank AG 85 6.20% $57,337
8 Royal Bank of Scotland 74 5.80% $53,352
Group
9 Merrill Lynch 81 5.20% $48,407
10 Goldman Sachs & Co. 60 5.10% $47,696
11 Citigroup 95 5.00% $46,754
12 UBS 74 4.30% $39,832
16. See In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“By
2006, . . . structured finance accounted for 54.2% of . . . [Moody’s] revenue” from its ratings
business).
17. See Ferrell et al., supra note 10, at 81.
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As the above Table Two shows, the top six firms controlled over 50%
of this market, and the top dozen over 80%. Even the smallest of these—the
twelfth largest firm—had a 4.3% market share. In other words, that client
alone has over four times the business (and the leverage) that Exxon had in
our earlier hypothetical as the largest corporate bond issuer.
Now, you may be asking yourself: “What does this all have to do with
ethics?” The relationship is simple: the professional independence of the
agent or of the gatekeeper is going to be under much greater stress once we
have a concentrated market in which each customer can credibly threaten to
take its business elsewhere.
Indeed, customers did start threatening to take their business else-
where. For years, the ratings market was dominated by a duopoly—
Moody’s and Standard & Poor—and the normal practice was always that
the issuer had to get two ratings. Hence, you really had to go to both of
them. That immunized them from pressure. They could act as they thought
best and protect their reputational capital.
However, around 2000—just at the beginning of the relevant time pe-
riod—a French firm acquired Fitch Ratings, decided to expand it, and
quickly made it a major player in the industry. It made a series of acquisi-
tions, buying up some smaller ratings firms, and quickly Fitch grew in mar-
ket share.18
By the time we get into the real problematic period—2005 to 2006—
Fitch is accounting for 40 to 45 percent of all ratings.19 That meant that the
clients of Moody’s and S&P realistically could go elsewhere. Normally, we
value competition and believe it makes markets work. But in terms of the
market for gatekeepers, competition can be a strong corrosive force that can
undercut professional independence.
Academics have begun to investigate this relationship between compe-
tition and professional independence. Set forth below is a chart showing
how ratings inflated under the pressure of competition among ratings
agencies:
18. For a general background and a description of the changes in the competitive position of
the credit ratings firms, see Bo Becker & Todd T. Milbourn, Reputation and Competition: Evi-
dence From the Credit Rating Industry, 4–5, 24, (Harv. Bus. Sch. Fin. Working Paper No. 09-051,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1278150.
19. Id. at 25.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 10  7-AUG-09 14:56
412 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:2
TABLE 3
To understand this chart, you need to know that BBB minus is the
lowest investment-grade rating. Ratings below this grade are considered
speculative or, if you prefer, a “junk bond.” Ratings from BBB minus and
above are considered investment-grade ratings. Many institutions are le-
gally bound to buy only investment-grade bonds; thus, they must obtain an
investment-grade rating from an NRSRO credit rating agency.
As the foregoing chart shows, high competition appears to have pro-
duced a much higher percentage of investment-grade ratings. Indeed, all
investment-grade ratings (i.e., those above BBB-) increased under high
competition.
Conversely, if we focus on the junk scores (i.e., those below BBB-),
the same chart again shows that lower ratings were also more prevalent
under low competition. In sum, low competition yields more non-invest-
ment-grade speculative ratings but fewer investment-grade ratings. In turn,
high competition produces a higher ratio of investment-grade to non-invest-
ment-grade ratings.
Permit me a possibly irrelevant and certainly irreverent aside here: I
believe I have witnessed over a career this same process in academia. As
student teaching reviews became more common (and possibly as student
input received more weight in faculty tenure and promotion reviews), grade
inflation also resulted. In both worlds, those subject to increased scrutiny
raised their grades to please those who had influence over them.
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ACT THREE
  Now, let me move next to my third chapter: the consequences of deregu-
lation and the collapse of the investment banks. The story so far has focused
only on the rating agencies. But investment banks can also play a gatekeep-
ing role. They are expected to screen and vet offerings. When things are
working well, they do a pretty good job of it.
But the advent of structured finance changed their role as well. Now
they become the principal, rather than the agent, because the investment
bank is normally the promoter who markets these loan portfolios.
The relevant story begins in Europe in 2002, when the European
Union adopted something called the Financial Conglomerate Directive.20
This directive said exactly what the SEC has long wanted to say (but was
denied the power to say): that in evaluating the solvency and capital ade-
quacy of a regulated entity, such as a bank or a broker/dealer, the regulator
had to consider the parent company as well.21
In short, the regulator has to review the parent company’s financials
and evaluate the conglomerate as a whole from a top-down perspective.
European regulators feared—quite reasonably—that the parent company
could take actions that would, in a crisis, jeopardize the solvency of the
regulated entity, the bank or the broker/dealer.
That was the sort of regulation the SEC had long wanted the power to
impose. Yet, the SEC has consistently been denied that power—particularly
by Congress in 2000. This move by Europe in 2002 created something of a
crisis for American financial institutions. Suddenly, this meant that all U.S.
financial institutions that were operating in Paris or London were going to
be examined for the first time from the top down. This was not so problem-
atic for the commercial banks, but it was a major crisis for U.S. investment
banks.
Why? Because the European Union’s directive came with an escape
clause. In essence, it said: If, however, the foreign entity is regulated under
a functionally equivalent system of regulation, then it is immune from this
regulatory edict, and you don’t have to consider them; we’ll rely on the
foreign regulator so long as it’s a similar system.22
For commercial banks, this clause averted any crisis, because commer-
cial banks are regulated by the Federal Reserve, which does look at them
from the top down (i.e., from the parent company down to the regulated
entity, the banking subsidiary). Think of Citigroup as the parent and Cit-
20. Council Directive 2002/87, 2003 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EC).
21. For an overview of this directive and the response to it, see Jorge E. Vinuales, The Inter-
national Regulation of Financial Conglomerates: A Case-Study of Equivalence as an Approach to
Financial Integration, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J., 1, 2 (2006).
22. Id. at 20.
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icorp, the bank, as the subsidiary. While the Federal Reserve looks at every-
thing, the SEC was only able to look at the broker/dealer subsidiary.
In response to the E.U. directive, American investment banks immedi-
ately rushed to the SEC to say—of all things—“Regulate us, please, regu-
late us. We need to have a ‘functionally similar’ system of regulation so
we’ll be exempt from the prying eyes of those European regulators.”23
Seeing an opportunity, the SEC agreed to establish something called
the Consolidated Supervised Entity Program (or “CSE”), which applied to
only five investment banks, the five largest American investment banks.24
Everyone knows their names: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill
Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns—Bear Stearns, just barely.
Those five entered into this Consolidated Supervised Entity program,
and the trade-off was that the SEC would examine their financial statements
from the parent company on down, looking at the whole group. However, in
having their financial statements examined, they were allowed to opt in to
Basel II criteria under which they were allowed to design their own credit
model. Thus, in this new CSE program, the regulator would look at the
bank’s own credit risk model, including the bank’s own evaluation of the
riskiness of their assets, and then determine whether or not the models
seemed prudent.
The SEC permitted these five firms to be exempted from the SEC’s
traditional Net Capital Rule, which required specific ratios of debt to eq-
uity.25 Instead, it let these five firms design their own individualized credit
model, which it then appraised.
To implement this new system, the SEC assigned three staffers to each
of these five CSE banks. Let me repeat that: they assigned three individu-
als,26 probably younger staffers, as it was by no means the fastest ticket to
the top in terms of a career path for an SEC staffer.
Those three people would then look at a model designed by all the
financial analysts that a Merrill Lynch found it useful to employ. Poten-
tially, the investment bank might use fifty economists, each with Ph.D.’s
from MIT to design a credit model that enabled it to increase leverage (and
hence short-term profits).
23. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 2008, at A1 (describing major investment banks as having made an “urgent plea” to the SEC for
an exemption in April 2004).
24. See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consoli-
dated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004).
25. See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
26. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF
BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM (RE-
PORT NO. 446-A) 2 (2008).
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It was, from the outset, a mismatch. Three young staffers against all
the financial economists Merrill Lynch wished to use to design a model that
would reach the conclusions that its CEO needed to reach.
What happened? Well, the SEC’s Inspector General Report shows that
in a very short period of time, 2006 to 2008, gross leverage went up at all of
these banks significantly.27 Each bank used a different model, but all of
them increased their leverage under this new system to levels as high as a
33:1 gross leverage ratio.28
Even this estimate probably understates the true leverage, because ra-
tios work off the face of the financial statement. Thus, these ratios ignore
the off-balance-sheet obligations, particularly something called “liquidity
puts,” which were obligations under which banks agree to buy back the
loans they were selling to hedge funds if the loans lost liquidity. This ulti-
mately proved to be the number one problem for Citigroup.
Why did leverage increase rapidly after 2000? Increased leverage is
probably the quickest way for a financial institution to increase profitability,
and thus market pressures pushed all of them towards increased leverage.
Structured finance, though, had a special characteristic. I pointed out to
you earlier that in the field of structured finance, the three largest underwrit-
ers were three independent investment banks, Morgan Stanley, Lehman,
and Bear Stearns. They are much, much smaller in terms of overall market
capitalization than their commercial banks. These independent investment
banks had a special problem. With the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in
1999, commercial banks were increasingly pushing the investment banks
out of the traditional corporate bond underwriting business. Commercial
banks were gaining a larger and larger share of the business.
Why? A very large commercial bank like Citigroup or J.P. Morgan
could market itself to a large corporation and say, “Why play around with
those little investment banks? We can give you everything you need with
one stop shopping. We can give you long term loans; we can give you
revolving credit agreements for short term capital. We can underwrite your
bonds. We can market your notes. We can do it all at once. Come to us.”
That synergy argument was working, and they were getting more of
the business. The business model for investment banks had to respond, and
investment banks saw their future in this new nimble field of asset-backed
securitization, which was a field in which high intellectual creativity could
be (and was) used. These were very bright people doing this, and they
thought they could keep ahead of their commercial bank rivals because they
believed they could innovate more quickly than anyone else.
As a result, they went hell for leather into asset-backed securitization
where the profit margins were high and the risks were not clearly known.
27. Id. at 120.
28. Id. at 19.
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To do so, they abandoned prudent diversification. Lehman, in particular,
made a series of acquisitions of—and ended up operating—real estate com-
panies.29 To some degree, their motive may have been that they would be
foreclosed from access to mortgages if the large commercial banks kept on
buying the major California banks that made mortgage loans.
In combination then, the investment banks were motivated to raise
their leverage levels and abandon diversification at the same time as the
SEC was inclined to pursue deregulation. The combination was deadly. All
five of the CSE firms either failed, were forced into shotgun mergers with
larger commercial banks, or—in the case of Goldman and Morgan Stan-
ley—survived but were converted by edict of the government into bank
holding companies.
So, what are the lessons of all this? First of all, financial institutions
have greater fragility than they themselves recognized. They face a funda-
mental mismatch of assets and liabilities. Their assets are often long-term
and illiquid, whereas their liabilities are often short-term, commercial paper
and the like. That is problem one.
Problem two: from the 1990s on, mortgage lending banks had clearly
shifted to a different business model—call it the “originate and distribute”
business model. Under this model, a financial institution sees itself as the
originator, and then, rather than holding assets for their duration, it sells
them off to the marketplace. That practice can undercut the incentive to
screen, to demand creditworthy borrowers. Ultimately, it can lead to the
moral hazard problem earlier described.
Now, let’s return to gatekeepers. My generalization here is that compe-
tition is good, except when it is bad. Yes, we want competition, but compe-
tition among gatekeepers can produce inflated results, as we earlier saw in
the Becker & Milbourn study.30 Similarly, competition among investment
banks can lead to excessive leverage and inadequate diversification.
Let me quote here what will undoubtedly be the most famous line to
come out of this whole episode. These are the immortal words of Citigroup
CEO Charles Prince in late 2007, when, with the crisis already cresting, he
gave an interview to the Financial Times. He was asked in effect: “Aren’t
you getting in over your head with all of these CDO investments and their
problems of illiquidity?” He answered them: “When the music stops in
terms of liquidity, things will get complicated, but as long as the music is
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”31 Nine
months later, he was fired. Yet, this is the statement of someone who real-
29. See Terry Pristin, Risky Real Estate Deals Helped Doom Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2008, at C6 (discussing Lehman’s real estate acquisitions).
30. See Becker & Milbourn, supra note 18.
31. See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup is ‘Still Dancing’ to the
Beat of the Buy-Out Boom, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 10, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5cefc794-
2e7d-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
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izes that problems are on the horizon and things are going to get compli-
cated. He sees the risks, but the fear of falling even slightly behind the
competition is more compelling. Collectively, other banks behaved the
same, and the result was a break-neck race over the cliff of financial
solvency.
Possibly, a contributing cause here were executive compensation for-
mulas, which in the world of investment banking were extraordinarily
short-term oriented. In investment banking, you eat what you kill in terms
of bonuses based on the year’s deals that close. If you are compensated for
what closes this year, you tend to worry less about whether this deal will
fail in five years. Indeed, many of these deals failed in a good deal less than
five years.
Next, reputational capital tends to be a weak force during times of
market stress. Reputational capital is what should in principle motivate
credit rating agencies to be serious, sober, and diligent, but it is not as effec-
tive when there is competition and market stress. The reputations that count
are not those that they have with investors, but those that they have with
clients.
What then should be the policy response? Above all, this crisis shows
the need for one systematic risk regulator. Now, what is a systematic risk
regulator?
We do not have one in the United States. Instead, we have a Balkan-
ized structure of financial regulation. A different regulator regulates each
class of financial institutions in the United States. At the state level, we
have regulators for insurance companies and state chartered banks. At the
federal level, we have different regulators for commercial banks, savings
banks, investment banks and broker/dealers. Meanwhile, no one truly regu-
lates hedge funds. Each one is different, and predictably, the intensity of
supervision differs among them.
The net result is regulatory arbitrage. By regulatory arbitrage, I mean
that a rational entity will design itself to fall within whichever of these
various classes is the least regulated. It is no surprise that AIG, now world
famous, managed to issue several hundred billion dollars of credit default
swaps from an unregulated, non-insurance subsidiary that was based in
London.
In part, they could do that because the state of New York was the only
regulator that had substantial jurisdiction over them. Even it only had juris-
diction over AIG’s insurance business, and the key subsidiary was a non-
insurance subsidiary of the non-insurance holding company. No one regu-
lated it, and on its own—with no one really looking—it issued over $200
billion of credit default swaps.
What must be done? We now know (perhaps sadly) that if you are too
big to fail, the government will step in, because society cannot accept the
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catastrophe that might follow. However, if you are too big to fail, you have
to be regulated so that you don’t fail. In theory, banks were always regu-
lated in this fashion, but a shadow banking system has arisen that is par-
tially outside the regulatory umbrella.
So, what would a systemic risk regulator do? At a minimum, it would
have authority to restrict leverage and regulate capital adequacy at all finan-
cial institutions, whether they are hedge funds, insurance companies, or
some new entity that we have yet to imagine. It might also have the author-
ity to restrict, or at least regulate, the trading in new financial products,
including credit default swaps.
The goal here is to focus on systemic risk, not on the individual institu-
tion, but on whether what it was doing could have a destabilizing impact on
the economy. Systemic risk is essentially the risk of linked financial col-
lapses, in which the first failure causes the second, and so on—much like a
cascade of falling dominos.
A first step towards reducing systemic risk would be to mandate the
use of clearinghouses, which is something the Federal Reserve has already
been trying to do. This would make them mandatory, rather than simply
encouraged. Similarly, such a regulator might be able to mandate write-
downs for risky classes of assets. For example, if there was a real estate
bubble, it could start the write-down process as soon as it realized the dan-
ger of overvaluation. The goal here is a countercyclical policy, rather than a
procyclical policy that responds only after the market starts to collapse. The
key idea here is that a systemic risk regulator should be able to adopt
counter-cycleable policies rather than after-the-fact procycleable policies.
But in truth, this is easier said than done.
By giving the systemic risk regulator broad jurisdiction, we avoid the
problem of regulatory arbitrage. But there remains the very real danger of
regulatory capture. It too might be minimized by the provision of broader
authority. When you only regulate only one small class of institutions, the
likelihood that you will be captured by the relevant industry grows signifi-
cantly. That is the standard critique of an agency such as the CFTC, which
regulates trading in futures.
The re-design of financial regulation in the United States poses some
very basic issues. Around the world, there are today two basic models.
First, there is the British model of a centralized universal regulator. That is
the British Financial Services Authority. It has authority over all kinds of
institutions; it is both a banking regulator and a securities regulator.
The alternative model is what is called a “Twin Peaks” model. Under a
Twin Peaks model you have a systemic risk regulator and you also have a
consumer/investor protection agency.
Examples of this are Australia and the Netherlands. The United States,
right now, has about a “Himalayan” model because we have different regu-
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latory agencies for every class of institution. The result is a Balkanized
structure.
Clearly, there needs to be some consolidation. However, I would tell
you the most important design issue for the near future involves the choice
between a universal systemic risk regulator and a Twin Peaks model.
Why do I care about this difference? Why do I favor the model that I
call the Twin Peaks model? Let me assert, based on some experience, that
the culture of securities regulators and the culture of banking regulators are
fundamentally different. Their experiences are different, what they fear is
different, and their resulting priorities are different.
Securities regulators around the world favor disclosure and trans-
parency as a matter of first principles. Around the world, banking regulators
fear one thing above all others: the run on the bank. Thus, their policies
strive to reduce creating any fear of insolvency that might harm the reputa-
tion of a financial institution.
Toward this end, they seek to assure that investors never panic. How
do you keep investors from panicking? Sometimes, you sweep problems
under the rug. That way, they should never have a reason to panic. If we
told them the truth, they might get scared and demand their money back.
Where does this analysis lead? Essentially, a universal regulator faces
a built-in tension: does it disclose adverse information to investors to assure
transparency or does it tend to suppress adverse information about financial
institutions to avert panic? That tension scares me, because when you put
all power and authority into a single agency, there are going to be low-
visibility or invisible trade-offs. Conflicts inevitably will arise between pro-
tecting investors with full disclosure and protecting bank solvency by sup-
pressing some of the uglier facts.
For these reasons, the better policy answer is the Twin Peaks model
that gives both of its agencies co-equal authority, with neither one having a
veto power over the other. To be sure, there still will be political trade-offs
and tensions. Indeed, these tensions should be resolved within the political
process, and there should be accountability for decisions. If the President
wants to go one way or the other, he largely can. However, the public
should know what is happening, because it will better understand what the
full consequences are.
These tensions are already surfacing today. One example involves
mark-to-market accounting. You will find that securities regulators gener-
ally want mark-to-market accounting. Banking regulators are much more
dubious; they see mark-to-market as one of the fundamental causes of what
they argue is a pro-cyclical policy that injures banks.
Beyond the re-design of our regulatory system, the next priority for
Congress and the regulatory agencies should be the need to restore due
diligence to the marketing and underwriting of securities. Once due dili-
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gence goes, once no one perceives a need to closely examine the product on
both the “buy” and “sell” sides, then problems necessarily follow.
In the years before the financial collapse of 2008, due diligence was
gradually abandoned. Deregulation was one reason for its demise, and an-
other probably was the uniquely short-term executive compensation poli-
cies that we have today in the United States. Executives knew that deals had
to close for them to earn their bonuses and due diligence became for some
firms simply an impediment to their closing.
Executives motivated by short-term “eat what you kill” compensation
formulas did not worry about whether, three years later, their firms would
develop acute indigestion from the toxic deals that they had swallowed
whole years earlier.
Ultimately, due diligence connects with legal ethics. When due dili-
gence disappears, public companies are willfully flying blind, and predict-
ably there will be an eventual crash.
